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Francis J. Facciolo and Leland S. Solon 
 
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act establishes a private breach of fiduciary duty cause 
of action for shareholders in an investment company, or mutual fund, to challenge the fees charged 
by the mutual fund’s investment adviser, in recognition of the fact that the adviser or one of its 
affiliates customarily creates the mutual fund and has a great deal of influence over the 
composition of the mutual fund’s board of directors or trustees, which negotiates the fees paid to 
the investment adviser. Under the Gartenberg standard, which was substantially adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris Associates, succeeding on an excessive fee claim is difficult, 
however, because Section 36(b) is violated only when the adviser charges a “fee that is so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could 
not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”1 
In the last several years, creative plaintiffs have looked to the fees paid by mutual funds to advisers 
and sub-advisers of mutual funds as a measuring tool to argue that fees are excessive. The plaintiffs 
have focused on the services provided to a mutual fund by the adviser and sub-advisers and have 
argued that the services are largely duplicative. If this is so, the logic goes, then why is the adviser 
paid such a large fee? 
This argument gained traction in Kasilag v. Hartford Investment Financial Services,2 where the 
plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss. As we predicted in a prior article,3 a large number of new 
Section 36(b) actions against mutual fund advisers have followed the Kasilag ruling, at least 11 as 
of today.4 We based our prediction in large part on the fact that section 36(b) litigation has been 
characterized by the entrepreneurial activities of plaintiffs’ law firms that develop legal theories 
that are then more broadly adopted, leading to waves of litigation each characterized by different 
legal theories.5 This article examines the current state of this litigation, focusing in particular on 
two additional motions to dismiss that have been decided in plaintiffs’ favor. 
Importance of the ‘Spread’ 
Many of the lawsuits highlight the “spread” between what the defendants charged their sponsored 
funds, on the one hand, and what defendants paid to their sub-advisers to perform the actual 
investment services, on the other. In a new wrinkle, some plaintiffs have highlighted defendants 
who acted as sub-advisers to other, non-sponsored funds, contrasting what the defendants charged 
their own sponsored funds to act as investment managers with what those defendants charged 
independent, sophisticated parties to act as investment manager/sub-advisers to those independent 
funds. The spreads alleged by plaintiffs between what the defendants charge their sponsored funds 
for the “investment management services” and what they paid sub-advisers are summarized in the 
accompanying table. 
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Adviser Paid Sub- 
Adviser 
$12.1m 
$16m 
Adviser 
Charged Fund 
$27.6m 
$27m 
Spread Spread as% Of 
Entire Fee 
56.2% 
40.7% 
Cox v. ING Investments, LLC 
Curd v. SEI Investments Management 
Corporation 
Davidson v. Blackrock Advisors, LLC 
Foote v. Blackrock Advisors, LLC 
Fox v. Blackrock Advisors, LLC* 
McClure v. Russell Inv. Management 
Co. 
Sanford v. AXA Equitable Funds 
Management 
Zehrer v. Harbor Capital Advisors 
$15.5m 
$11m 
$235.2m 
$235.2m 
$106.5m 
$57m 
$412.5m 
$412.5m 
$144m+ 
$164m 
$177.3m 
$177.3m 
$37.6m 
$107m 
43% 
43% 
26.1% 
65.2% 
from $1.1m to 
$7.2m 
$125m 
from $3m to 
$22.7m 
$225m 
from $263k to 
$21.5m 
$100.5m 
from 109% to 
2017% 
44.7% 
* The four Blackrock Advisory, LLC cases were consolidated into In re Blackrock Mutual Fund Advisory Fee 
Litigation, Case 3:14-cv-01165-JAP-DEA, with the defendants’ motion to dismiss pending as of Jan. 20, 2015. 
SOURCE: Authors 
 
Allegations of Spreads Between Defendants’ Charges and Payments to Sub-Advisers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addressing the spread, plaintiffs have compared the language in the fund advisory or investment 
management agreement (IMA) between the defendant and the fund with the subadvisory 
agreement between the defendant and the sub-adviser (or the agreement between the defendant 
and a third-party client, when the defendant is acting as the adviser or sub-adviser to a third party). 
The language in many of the advisory, IMA and sub-advisory agreements involved in the sub-
adviser cases appears virtually the same, with responsibility for investment decision-making 
belonging to the sub-advisers. 
In Foote v. Blackrock Advisors, for instance, the IMA between plaintiff’s funds and the defendant 
adviser provided that the defendant adviser would “act as investment adviser for and supervise 
and manage the investment and reinvestment” of the funds’ assets, “arrange ... for the purchase 
and sale of the securities,” “provide investment research,” and “supervise continuously the 
investment program” of the fund. The sub-advisory agreement between the defendant and its third-
party sub-advisers was essentially the same, the plaintiff argued, as it stated in pertinent part that 
the sub-adviser would act “as investment adviser for and managing the investment and 
reinvestment of” the fund’s assets “in its complete discretion,” “arrang[e] ... for the purchase and 
sale of securities and other assets,” and “provid[e] investment research and credit analysis.” 
With the spread as the overarching theme, the plaintiffs’ complaints also typically argue, as a 
matter of “economies of scale,” that the fee “breakpoints” that defendants offer as the size of their 
assets under management increase are in effect illusory and/or non-meaningful. This situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that, as some plaintiffs have alleged, defendants had agreed at arm’s-length 
to act as advisers (or sub-advisers) to similar but independent third-party funds, and granted them 
much more beneficial fee reductions. 
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The procedures followed by the board of directors or trustees of the funds who approve the 
defendants’ compensation arrangements are also attacked in the complaints. Several plaintiffs 
allege, inter alia, that the directors/trustees meet only a few times every year to review and approve 
the IMAs for hundreds of funds, and that the directors/trustees, who often receive six-figure 
compensation, are not truly independent because they have an incentive to remain on good terms 
in order to be reappointed by these fund sponsors, who are the defendants in these sub-adviser 
cases. 
Denying Motion to Dismiss 
In Zehrer v. Harbor Capital Advisors,6 the plaintiff alleged that its fund adviser’s fee was excessive, 
in light of the fact that, over the period in question, the adviser took $225 million in advisory fees 
from the fund, while paying its sub-advisers $125 million to provide the investment management 
services. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the adviser’s motion 
to dismiss, remarking that “[a]lthough it is far from clear that [Terrence] Zehrer will be able to 
meet the high standard for liability under §36(b), he has alleged sufficient facts specific to the fees 
paid to Harbor Capital to survive a motion to dismiss.” 
The plaintiff’s allegation “that a substantial portion of the tasks assigned to Harbor Capital in the 
Advisory Agreement are actually performed by the fund’s sub-advisor, Northern Cross and that 
Harbor Capital’s services ‘are minimal compared to the day-to-day responsibilities of managing 
[the fund’s] portfolio’ performed by Northern Cross” was the first allegation cited in its main 
Section 12(b)(6) discussion by the court, which remarked that the adviser’s counter-contention 
“that it retains significant responsibility for the fund’s management is better suited for summary 
judgment.” 
In an immediately following footnote, the court further rejected the adviser’s argument that the 
plaintiff’s delegation claim was “clearly rebutted by the advisory agreements,” asserting that “[t]he 
court has reviewed the agreements and believes that Zehrer’s allegation that Northern Cross is 
responsible for almost all the investment management of the fund is not clearly rebutted by the 
agreements.” In its main discussion that the complaint had sufficiently stated a Section 36(b) claim, 
the court also acknowledged the plaintiff’s contention that the adviser “received ‘economies of 
scale’ benefits as the fund grew that were not passed on to the fund.” 
The Zehrer decision cited, among other cases, Kasilag, in asserting that defendant’s argument that 
it “performed extensive services that were not delegated to the subadvisor ... was more 
appropriately addressed at summary judgment,” as well as Millenco v. MEVC Advisors,7 a 2002 
decision that featured sub-adviser allegations but that has not been previously cited in the new 
wave of sub-adviser cases. 
The second case that resulted in the denial of a motion to dismiss a Section 36(b) breach of 
fiduciary duty fee claim is a fund-of-funds case, American Chemicals & Equipment 401(k) 
Retirement Plan v. Principal Management Corporation (the ACE case), decided by the District 
Court for the Southern District of Iowa on Sept. 10, 2014.8 There, the fund-of-funds plaintiff 
alleged that, in the relevant time periods, the defendant advisers charged plaintiff’s funds, in 
addition to a three-basis-point investment management fee, a separate “acquired fund fee” (AFF) 
of $120 million in 2012 and $154 million in 2013. It was alleged that the defendants retained 
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approximately two-thirds of the AFF for themselves while giving the other one-third to the 
underlying affiliated funds’ investment advisers, which the complaint called “sub-advisers.” 
In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court first ruled that the plaintiff satisfied Section 
36(b)’s standing requirement that an action for breach of fiduciary duty for adviser’s receipt of 
compensation for services may only be brought by a “security holder” of the investment company 
that paid the challenged fee. Defendants had argued that, because the fund-of-fund plaintiff was 
not a shareholder of any of the underlying funds, it did not meet 36(b)’s definition of “security 
holder,” and thus lacked standing to challenge the fees of the underlying funds they invested in. 
In support, they cited to a 2011 36(b) decision also featuring one of the same defendants, Curran 
v. Principal Management Corporation, No. 4:09-cv-00433, 2011 WL 223872 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 24, 
2011), which held that because the fund-of-fund plaintiffs did not hold any “securities” in the 
underlying funds, they did not qualify as “security holder[s]” and thus were not entitled to bring 
claims regarding the fees charged by the underlying funds; however, the plaintiffs still had standing 
to challenge fees charged by the main adviser, of the fund in which they were shareholders. But 
the court in the ACE case rejected this argument and distinguished Curran, explaining: “Plaintiff 
alleges that the defendants, as advisers to the principal funds, first ‘pocket the entire acquired fund 
fee from the principal funds as investment money’ before distributing a portion of the fee to sub-
advisers for managing the underlying funds,” and thus seek “recovery only of the fees charged to 
plaintiff as a principal funds shareholder and kept by defendants as advisers to that fund.” 
Turning to the sufficiency of the complaint, the court recited the Gartenberg/Janes standard and 
remarked that “[a]t the heart of a 36(b) claim is the relationship between the fees charged to the 
fund and the services rendered to the fund.” The court found that the plaintiff’s complaint 
sufficiently alleged such a relationship, noting, among other allegations, plaintiff’s assertions that 
“the sub-advisers provide virtually all daily management services to” plaintiff’s funds, yet “receive 
only half the amount” of the AFF as defendants; and that “defendants provide no additional 
services beyond those for which they charge the investment management fee justifying their 
retention of the AFF.” 
The authors believe that the ACE case was incorrectly decided as an AFF is a regulatory 
requirement imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to represent the underlying 
expenses that a fund-of-funds pays to invest in the underlying funds in which it invests. This allows 
a shareholder in a fund-of-funds to understand both the indirect as well as direct expenses to which 
she is subject. The expenses are underlying fund expenses, not fund-of-fund expenses. This 
argument was raised and extensively briefed by the defendants in the ACE case in their motion to 
reconsider, which was denied on Dec. 2, 2014. 
Regardless of whether the ACE case was correctly decided, there is now significant precedent at 
the motion to dismiss stage. While many defendants argue that they have not delegated many 
services to their sub-advisers, whether and to what extent the additional services justify the spreads 
will be a strong consideration in the outcome of these cases on the merits. In the authors’ view, 
without being able to quantify the costs of such services, the defendants in those cases that rely on 
the additional services they provide seem unlikely to prevail, especially on a motion to dismiss. 
Looking forward from these motions to dismiss decisions, the next benchmark decisions to look 
for would be those arising from summary judgment motions, which no Section 36(b) plaintiff has 
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ever won. 
1  Factors to be considered include: (1) the adviser-manager’s cost in providing the service, (2) the extent 
to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the fund grows larger, (3) the volume of 
orders which must be processed by the manager, as well as the nature and quality of the services 
provided to the fund and shareholders; (4) the profitability of the fund to the adviser; (5) any “fall-out 
financial benefits,” those collateral benefits that accrue to the adviser because of its relationship with 
the mutual fund; (6) comparative fee structure (meaning a comparison of the fees with those paid by 
similar funds); and (7) the independence, expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in 
evaluating adviser compensation.” See e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982); Jones v. Harris Associates, 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010). 
2  2012 WL 6568409 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2012). 
3  “New Wave of Cases Involving Investment Adviser Fees,” NYLJ, Oct. 10, 2013. 
4  The best source for following the ongoing litigation involving sub-adviser fees is 
http:/linvestorscoalition.com/litigation-tracker. 
5  See Quinn Curtis and John Morley, “The Flawed Mechanics of Mutual Fund Fee Litigation” at 12, 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2405307 (pointing to three prior waves of section 36(b) 
litigation involving, respectively, two South Carolina law firms, Milberg LLP and Baron & Budd). 
Several sub-adviser cases discussed in this article have been brought by two law firms: Robbins, 
Arroyo, in San Diego, has brought four, and Zwerling, Schachter & Zwerling, in New York, has 
brought three. 
6  2014 WL 6478054 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 18,  2014). 
7  2002 WL 31051604 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002). 
8  Order denying motion to dismiss, Case 4:14-cv-00044-JAJ-HCA, (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2014). 
                                                          
